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BURNHAM v. GAS & ELEC. CO.
Any person convicted of shoplifting shall be guilty of a
felony if the value of the goods, wares or merchandise so
taken or concealed is more than One Hundred Dollars
($100.00), or if the person so convicted shall have been
twice before convicted of shoplifting, and shall restore
the goods, wares or merchandise to the owner thereof, or
pay the full value therefor, and shall be punished by fine
of not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) nor more
than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or by imprison-
ment for not less than Three (3) nor more than Seven (7)
years in the penitentiary, or by both fine and imprisonment.
SECTION 7: If any part, section, paragraph, clause, sen-
tence, or provision of this act shall be held invalid for any
reason, the remainder of this act, or other applications
thereof, shall not be affected thereby, and to this end, the
provisions of this act are declared severable.
SECTION 8: This act is declared to be in addition to any
other criminal provision heretofore existing in this state.
SECTION 9: All laws, or parts of laws, inconsistent with
the provisions of this act are hereby repealed to the extent
of the inconsistency.
SECTION 10: Nothing in this act shall affect any cause
of action which has accrued prior to the effective date
hereof.
NELSON R. KERR, JR.
Shades Of The Rule In Shelley's Case
Burnham v. Gas & Electric Company'
An action in ejectment was brought in the Circuit Court
of Baltimore County by the plaintiffs, Burnham and Lee,
against the defendant, Baltimore Gas & Electric Company.
The suit developed out of a deed executed on June 28, 1852,
by which Daniel and Nancy Warfield conveyed certain de-
scribed real estate to Eliza Ann Lee in trust for the joint
lives of her two infant children, Priscilla and Mary Ann
Lee, without impeachment of waste, and with remainder
to their heirs in fee simple. Eliza Ann Lee died in 1874.
Her daughter, Priscilla Lee, who was born in 1843, died
in 1861, leaving only one child, from whom the plaintiff,
Charles Frank Lee, Jr., was descended. Mary Ann Lee
married and had fourteen children, one of whom is the
plaintiff, Albert Washington Burnham. She died intestate
in 1943. In 1924, Mary Ann Lee purported to grant to the
1217 Md. 507, 144 A. 2d 80 (1958).
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defendant, by deed duly recorded, a right of way over the
land in question. Pursuant thereto, defendant erected and
continuously maintained an electric transmission line across
the property.
In their suit to eject the defendant, plaintiffs contended
that because Mrs. Burnham (Mary Ann Lee) was only a
life tenant, the defendant's easement across the property
terminated with her death. Defendant answered that Mrs.
Burnham became owner in fee of a one-half undivided in-
terest in the property by virtue of the operation of the rule
in Shelley's case.2 From the trial court's summary judg-
ment sustaining the defendant's contention, plaintiffs ap-
pealed, contending that the rule in Shelley's case was not
applicable because the life estates to the daughters of Eliza
Ann Lee were equitable and the remainder to their heirs
was legal, and that the two estates were, therefore, in-
capable of coalescing under the rule in Shelley's case.
The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' contentions
and concluded that the rule in Shelley's case did apply; that
the trusts were passive and executed by the Statute of
Uses3 into legal estates; that the rule in Shelley's case
operated to transfer the legal remainder interest to the
life tenants; and that the two interests merged in the an-
cestors to give them fee simple estates which passed by in-
heritance to the plaintiffs. The court held further, however,
that the easement which was given by Mrs. Burnham, only
one of the joint life tenants, was not binding upon the
heirs of Priscilla Lee, whose consent to the grant of the
easement was never acquired, but that the easement would
be binding upon the heirs of Mrs. Burnham. Judgment of
the trial court was affirmed only as to the plaintiff heirs of
Mrs. Burnham, and reversed as to plaintiff, Charles Lee,
and remanded for further proceedings.
Those who may have believed that the Maryland statute
abolishing the rule in Shelley's case4 placed the rule at
eternal rest will be surprised to find the rule applied in
the instant case, some forty-six years after enactment of
2 Infra, n. 6.
827 Hen. VIII c. 10 (1535), 1 ALEX. BRIT. STAT. (2nd ed. 1912) 292.
'8 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 93, § 366:
"Whenever by any form of words In any deed, will or other instru-
ment executed after the thirty-first day of May, in the year nineteen
hundred and twelve, a remainder in real or personal property shall be
limited, mediately or immediately, to the heirs or the heirs of the body
of a person to whom a life estate in the same property is given, the
persons who on the termination of the life estate are then the heirs
or the heirs of the body of such tenant for life, shall take as pur-
chasers by virtue of the contingent remainder so limited to them."
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the statute. As, however, the statute only abolishes the
rule with respect to instruments executed subsequent to
May 31, 1912,5 it should not be too surprising to see it re-
vived here, where the deed was executed in 1852. From
time to time such instruments may still be uncovered, but
as we progress farther from the date of the statute, the
likelihood of there being occasion for applying the rule in
Shelley's case substantially diminishes.
The case from which the rule in Shelley's case derives
its name was decided in 1581.6 The statement of the rule
which is probably most intelligible to the modern reader
is that of Chancellor Kent.7 In substantially the same lan-
guage as used by Kent, this rule has been repeated, indorsed
and applied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.' From
the various statements of the rule, it has been deduced that
the following elements are indispensably prerequisite to
its application: (1) there must be a freehold estate in the
ancestor (sometimes called the "first taker");9 (2) both
5 To this effect is the statement of the Court of Appeals in Bowman v.
Weer, 204 Md. 344, 350, 104 A. 2d 620 (1954) :
"This rule, which was followed in this state for many years, was
abolished by the Legislature, not retroactively, by the Laws of
1912 ....
Shelley's case, 1 Coke 93b, 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234 (1581). Lord
Coke stated the rule thus:
"[W]hen the ancestor ,by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of
freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited
either mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in taill; ...
'the heirs' are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of
purchase."
At the time Shelley's case was decided, the doctrine pronounced in it was
considered to be of ancient origin. The case cited several judgments in
the Year Books of the time of Edward III in support of it. See cases cited
in SIMES & SMITH, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed., 1956), § 1542.
Although apparently the rule had been long recognized, it seems equally
clear that it did not gain widespread prominence until Shelley's case, which
is briefly stated in Lyles v. Digges, 6 H. & J. 364, 370 (Md. 1825).
4 KINT'S COMMENTARIES (12th & 13th eds., 1884) 215:
"'When a person takes an estate in freehold, legally or equitably,
under a deed, will, or other writing, and in the same instrument there
is a limitation by way of remainder, either with or without the inter-
position of another estate, of an interest of the same legal or equitable
quality, to his heirs, or heirs of his body, as a class of persons to take
in succession, from generation to generation, the limitation to the
heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole estate.'"
See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) 1740, § 312(1).
S Simpers v. Simpers, 15 Md. 160, 186 (1860) ; Timanus v. Dugan, 46 Md.
402, 416 (1877) ; Clarke v. Smith, 49 Md. 106, 117 (1878) ; Handy v. McKim,
64 Md. 560, 573, 4 A. 125 (1886) ; Waller v. Pollitt, 104 Md. 172, 173-174,
64 A. 1040 (1906).
9In 1 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY (1952) 483 it is stated that in the United
States, no case has been found in which the rule in Shelley's case has been
applied where there was not a life estate in the ancestor. To the same
effect are statements in the following authorities: 3 POWELL ON REAL PROP-
ERTY (1952) 243; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) 1741; SismS & SMITH,
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the devise or grant to the ancestor and the limitation to
his heirs must be contained in the same instrument; ° (3)
the remainder must be to "heirs", in the technical meaning
of that term as a word of limitation, not as a word of pur-
chase;" and (4) the interest of the ancestor and that limited
to the heirs must both be of the same quality.12 If any one
of these elements is absent, the rule in Shelley's case cannot
be applied." If they are all present, then the rule will
operate to make the remainder to the heirs, a remainder to
the ancestor himself. Having in himself both a remainder
in fee simple and life estate, the ancestor takes a fee simple
through merger of the two estates, provided there is no
intervening estate. 4
Although there are many difficulties incident to deter-
mining whether or not any of the aforementioned elements
exist in a given case,' 5 certainly one of the most perplexing
of those difficulties is the requirement that the freehold
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed., 1956) 435. It seems clear that in Mary-
land, this would also 'be true since the only existing freehold interest
other than the fee simple is the life estate. It Is manifestly impossible
that the first taker could have a fee simple estate, since no remainder could
follow such an interest. 1 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY (1952) § 4.27.
103 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) 1757, § 3121; 26 C.J.S. 951, Deeds,
§ 123; of. Rhodes v. Brinsfield, 151 Md. 477, 480, 135 A. 245 (1926).
u "The word 'limitation', then, as used . . . in the rule in Shelley's
case, must be understood as a word of boundary, that is, as a word
describing the extent or quality of the estate conveyed, and the word
'purchase', . . . must be understood to mean an estate acquired in a
manner to take it out of the ordinary course of descent, that is, as
designating certain persons who are to take the estate." 29 L.R.A.
(NS) 963, 971.
'* This is interpreted to mean that the estate of the ancestor and that of
the remainderman must both be legal or both be equitable. Ware v.
Richardson, 3 Md. 505, 545 (1853) ; Peter v. Peter, 136 Md. 157, 169, 110
A. 211 (1920) ; Handy v. McKim, 64 Md. 560, 573, 4 A. 125 (1886). Con-
versely, the rule is held universally to be inapplicable if the life estate is
a legal interest and the remainder an equitable interest, or vice versa. See
SIMES & SMITH, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed., 1956) § 1552; see
also 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940), 1755, § 312h.
18 Supra, ns. 7-12; also see Griffith v. Plummer, 32 Md. 74, 77 (1870);
Shreve v. Shreve, 43 Md. 382, 394 (1875) ; Beggs v. Erb, 138 Md. 345, 349-
350, 113 A. 881 (1921).
u Professor Powell explains this as follows: When A conveys land "to
B for life, then to heirs of B", the unabrogated rule in Shelley's case changes
the quoted limitation into one "to B for life, then to B and his heirs".
The law of merger then operates upon the changed remainder to transfer
it, in effect, into one "to B and his heirs". The process by which the
ancestor acquires an estate of inheritance thus falls into two stages: (a)
the true operation of the rule in Shelley's case; and (b) the connected
operation of the principles of merger. 3 POWELL ON RnAT PROPERTY (1952),
§ 379.
For a scholarly presentation and analysis of the rule in Shelley's case,
and an acute discussion of the difficulties inherent in interpreting and
applying the rule, see annotation in 29 L.R.A. (NS) 963 et 8eq., and also,
SIMES & SMITH, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed., 1956), §§ 1541 to 1572.
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estate and the limitation to heirs be of the same quality.
Whether or not that requirement was satisfied was one
of the principal problems of the subject case, in which the
estate of the ancestors was subject to a trust. Whenever
trust estates are involved, it is necessary to determine
whether the trusts are active or passive. If the trust is
active, it cannot be executed under the Statute of Uses;"
if passive, the equitable trust estate is executed by the
Statute of Uses into a legal estate.17
The trust estates in the subject case appeared to be
passive, for they imposed no expressly stated active duties
on the trustee; under that trust, the trustee merely held
the trust estates for the benefit of the cestui que trust. The
plaintiffs contended, however, that despite the complete
absence of any expressly stated duties, such duties could
be inferred. In support of their contention, they cited
Ware v. Richardson,8 an early Maryland case, which held
that where property is conveyed or devised to a trustee
for the separate use of a married woman, the trustee has
a quasi active duty to perform in protecting it from the
husband and his creditors, and that because of such quasi
active duty, the Statute of Uses could not execute the
trusts. But, as the court notes in the subject case, Ware v.
Richardson19 also contains the very significant dictum that:
"... the mere interposition of a trustee to protect and
secure a trust estate in a third person even though a
married woman, will not prevent the use from being
executed in the cestui que use, unless there is attached
to the trustee the performance of some active functions
or duties in order to support the trust."
The implication of this statement seems to be that no
active duties will be inferred unless the instrument speci-
Handy v. McKim, 64 Md. 560, 569, 4 A. 125 (1886). An active trust is
one which imposes upon the trustee the duty of taking active measures
in the execution of the trust, as where property is conveyed to trustees with
directions to sell and distribute the proceeds among the creditors of the
grantor. In addition to the above Maryland case, see In re Buch's Estate,
278 Pa. 185, 122 A. 239, 240 (1923) ; Welch v. Northern Bank & Trust Co.,
100 Wash. 349, 170 P. 1029, 1032 (1918) ; also fn. 17, infra.
'
7 Handy v. McKim, 64 Md. 560, 569, 4 A. 125 (1886). A passive trust is one
.whereby the trustee is merely the depository of the legal title, with
no duties except to make a conveyance when called upon by the cestul que
trust, and to defend the legal title, or to allow his name to be used for
the purpose; . . ." 1 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, (3rd ed. 1939) 425. Ex-
amples of what are apparently passive trusts are contained in Porterfield
v. Porterfield, 85 Md. 663, 666, 37 A. 358 (1897) ; Brandau v. McCurley,
124 Md. 243, 246, 250, 92 A. 540 (1914).




fically states that the estate is conveyed for the separate
use of a married woman, and that where the cestui que
trust is unmarried and no marriage was in contemplation
when the instrument took effect, no active duties will be
inferred.20 But, whether or not an inference that the trus-
tee has active duties to perform will be raised under such
circumstances seems to have become practically a moot
question since the enactment of legislation to protect mar-
ried women in their separate property rights."
Rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that active duties
might be inferred where the beneficiary of a trust is an
infant, the Court cited several cases in support of its con-
clusion that "[t]he fact that the beneficiary of a trust is an
infant is not of itself enough to convert a trust which im-
poses no active duties upon the trustee from a passive
trust to an active one."22 But, the Court pointed out that
whether or not active duties should be inferred in the case
of the trustee for minor children was not determinative in
the instant case, for even if such duties were to be inferred,
a familiar rule of the law of Trusts would have operated
nevertheless. Under that rule, a trust, active in its incep-
tion, becomes passive when the purposes for its creation
have ended.2" Thus, in the instant case, where one of the
daughters died before attaining her majority and the other
married, but outlived her husband, those events terminated
the trusts even if it were assumed, on any of the bases
contended for, that they were initially active.
Under either approach, therefore, (a) that the trusts
were initially passive or (b) that they were initially active
and later became passive, the Court reached the result that
at the time of the conveyance of the easement the trusts
were passive and the Statute of Uses would execute them
1 Wherever an inference has been raised that active duties attach to
the trustee for a married woman, the deed of trust or will seem always
to have contained specific provision that the estate conveyed was for the
separate and sole use of the married woman. For example, see Ware v.
Richardson, 8upra, n. 18; Warner v. Sprigg, 62 Md. 14 (1884) ; Bowen v.
Chase, 94 U.S. 812 (1876).
2 Such legislation makes completely unnecessary the use of the trust de-
vice as a means of conveying property to a married woman where the only
motive for establishing the trust Is protection of the property from the
husband and his creditors. 4 MD. Cona (1957), Art. 45, §§ 1, 3 and 4.
2Hooper v. Felgner, 80 Md. 262, 30 A. 911 (1894); Warner v. Sprigg, 62
Md. 14 (1884) ; Owens v. Crow, 62 Md. 491 (1884) ; Lee v. O'Donnell, 95
Md. 538, 52 A. 979 (1902) ; Potomac Lodge v. Miller, 118 Md. 405, 84 A.
554 (1912).
1 Owens v. Crow, ibid (personalty) ; Numsen v. Lyon, 87 Md. 31, 39 A.
533 (1898) ; Thompson v. Ballard, 70 Md. 10, 17, 16 A. 378 (1889) ; Lee v.
O'Donnell, 95 Md. 538, 545, 52 A. 979 (1902) ; Potomac Lodge v. Miller, 118
Md. 405, 417, 84 A. 554 (1912).
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into legal estates.24 As the plaintiffs and defendant both
conceded that the remainder to the heirs was a legal inter-
est, both the life estate and the remainder were of the same
quality and capable of coalescing through operation of the
rule in Shelley's case.
In this case, the court seemed to have no hesitancy in
holding that the rule would be operative wherever there
was a legal remainder interest preceded by an equitable
life estate which subsequently became legal. SIMES AND
SMITH, 2 5 however, state their belief that if the rule in
Shelley's case was inapplicable to such a conveyance when
the limitations first took effect, there is no reason why it
should be applied thereafter. They say:
"The rule in Shelley's case is absurd enough as usually
applied; but to extend it so as to transform a contingent
remainder in the heirs into a vested remainder in the
ancestor years after the original conveyance and just
because the ancestor's equitable life estate became a
legal one is even more ridiculous.
"The primary notion of the application of the rule
in Shelley's case is that it arbitrarily says certain words
in a deed or will mean something which the one who
used them did not intend. But it is an effect given to
the words in a deed or will when the instrument takes
effect, not an effect given to subsequent events. It is
much more consistent with the great bulk of the cases
on the rule to say that it applies only at the time the
instrument takes effect and not at any subsequent
period. '26
Despite the objection of authors SrMES AND SMITH to
application of the rule in Shelley's case in such circum-
stances, there are some Pennsylvania cases27 which support
the court's decision that the rule should so operate. In
Steacy v. Rice28 property was devised to a trustee for the
separate use of a married woman for life. She subsequently
became a widow. In holding that the woman took an estate
in fee simple at the time her husband died, by operation
of the rule in Shelley's case, the Court stated:
Handy v. McKim, 64 Md. 560, 569, 4 A. 125 (1886).
SIMES & SMITH, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed., 1956) 472, § 1562.
Ibid, 473.
McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 (1859) ; Steacy v. Rice, 27 'Pa. 75 (1856)




"The life estate she took was legal after the special
trust had ended, and there was then nothing in the
quality of the two estates to prevent them from uniting.
* * * Can it make any difference that it was not exe-
cuted immediately, if it was executed at all, within
the period of its duration? I cannot see why it should."2 "
There seem to be no Maryland cases in which the ques-
tion arose or an answer to it was intimated; nor does the
problem seem to have arisen in any jurisdiction other than
Pennsylvania." The court then, in the subject case, was
confronted with a choice between the view espoused by
the Pennsylvaina court in the aforementioned cases, all of
which are quite old, and that of the authors, SvMEs AND
SMITH, whose views are presumably founded on the modern
tendency to avoid application of the rule wherever it is
reasonably possible. It chose to follow the former view.
One must admit that this choice is somewhat surprising
in view of the attitude toward application of the rule which
the court manifested in Bowman v. Weer,"' decided just a
few years earlier. There, the court said:
"The Courts in this State, however, have always
endeavored to hold that the rule does not apply and
I Ibid, 82. Similar facts were involved in McKee v. McKinley, Nice's
Appeal and Dodson v. Ball, supra, n. 27, and In each of those cases, the
court had no qualms about applying the rule In Shelley's case where estates
to ancestor and to heirs were originally not of the same quality, but sub-
sequently became so.
8 The court, in the instant case (516) cites Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md.
67 (1881) as supporting the rule that "[ulpon the termination of any . . .
active trust . . . the Rule in Shelley's case would then operate." This
writer is unable to find anything In the Renshaw case which declares or
supports such a rule directly or inferentially.
Also cited by the court in the subject case Is 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1940) 1756, which makes this statement:
"At the time the conveyance takes effect the estate for life in the
ancestor may be of one quality and the required remainder another, but
later this situation may change so that 'both become legal or both be-
come equitable. If such change does occur after the effective date of the
Instrument and occurs automatically as a result of the term of the
first conveyance, the requirement that the estate for life and the re-
quired remainder both be legal or both equitable is then satisfied and
the rule . . . applies, if the other requirements for the application of
this rule are satisfied . ... "
Citing this section of the RESTATEMENT and also Dodson v. Ball, supra,
n. 27, as authority, 1 AM. LAW OF PROPiRTY (1952) 492 contains the more
succinct statement: ". .. In these cases where the requirements of the rule
are not met at the inception of the instrument, the rule Is applied when
the requirements are met."
One sees easily the circularity of the authority used to support this view.
Ultimately, one returns to the four Pennsylvania cases cited supra, n. 27,
as being the only authority for it.81204 Md. 344. 104 A. 2d 620 (1954).
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have sought some 'inconsistent provision or word which
would exclude its application'. The decisions of this
Court require that we adopt the restrictive construc-
tion which gives effect to the natural and primary
meaning of the words used, rather than an arbitrary
meaning by an artificial rule of law." 2
On the facts of the Bowman case," there is little doubt that
the rule in Shelley's case was not applicable there, but what
is of interest in that case is not the court's decision, but its
reaffirmation of disfavor toward the rule and its clear state-
ment of intention to do all possible to avoid applying it.
Confronted in the Burnham case 4 with a question of first
impression in Maryland, the court chose to adhere to a
view which made possible the application of the rule.
MARTIN A. DYEm
Defaulting Vendee's Right To Recover Part Payment
On A Contract To Purchase Real Estate
Quillen v. Kelley'
Plaintiffs brought an action for the return of their part
payment of the price of the "Hotel Royalton" which they
had contracted to purchase together with certain chattels
therein.
The plaintiffs and a Mrs. Cook as vendees and the Kel-
leys as vendors executed the contract September 1, 1952,
the purchase price of the hotel being $257,500. The vendors
were to receive a net amount of $245,000 for the property
and $12,500 commission was to be paid to Mrs. Cook, a
broker. At the time of signing the contract, the vendees
paid the vendors $15,000 as the contract provided. A fur-
ther sum of $20,000, due November 1, 1952, was paid in
full at that time.2 The plaintiffs requested that the next
payment, $40,000 due in February, 1953, be reduced to
$10,000, apparently because Mrs. Cook, one of the three
vendees, had died insolvent. The defendants refused, and
-Ibid, 350.
"Ibid.
"217 Md. 507, 144 A. 2d 80 (1958).
1216 Md. 396, 140 A. 2d 517 (1958).
2 On November 1, -the vendees paid the vendors $12,500 and the vendors
gave vendees a credit of $7,500 for the balance due Mrs. Cook as her com-
mission.
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